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Adolph Reed, Jr. 
Three years ago, after the Black Panther Party had recanted and re- 
turned to the Baptist Church, the only self-styled 'Marxistf political 
tendency to be found on this side of the veil was that embodied in the 
Black Workers Congress which, according to its somewhat generous self- 
assessment, was not only 'Marxist-Leninist' but 'Maoist' as well. Every 
other tendency among black people was hostile to Marxism. The arguments 
scarcely need to be recalled : "Marx and Engels were Europeans; what can 
racist Europeans have to say that is useful to us?" "Why do you have to 
depend on the white man for your ideology; can't we develop something 
new of our own?" etc. Of course there was also a great deal of red- 
baiting going on and even more self-righteous posturing. 
Then, not too much longer than a year and a half ago a detectable 
'Marxist' embryo was formed within the African Liberation Support Com- 
mittee. This embryo in its way quickly developed into a militant, 
hardcore 'Marxist' faction within ALSC, a faction engaged in heavy 
"ideological struggle" with a 'culturalist' faction perceived by the 
'Marxists' as a right wing. This "ideological struggle" harkened images 
of the internecine Panther/US struggle for control of the UCLA black 
studies budget. However, perhaps partially because no money was involved, 
this more recent "ideological struggle" had not been as deadly. Still, 
battle lines were drawn sharply, and the levels of bombast and factional 
self-righteousness could not have been much more intense in a real war. 
Just as the 'contradiction' sharpened to the point of rupture a 
major and unexpected blow fell on the 'culturj+l nationalists'. Their 
leader, Imamu Baraka, publicly defected at the ALSC national conference 
in Greensboro last winter. 
Despite the joy exuded by the missionaries of "scientific socialism"' 
at his conversion, Baraka's reversal is significant only in a sense that 
has nothing to do with the likely effects of his action. It must be kept 
in mind that all of this "ideological struggle" has gone on in a vacuum 
of outreaching political practice; only Baraka was even alleged to have 
a popular base, and that allegation was shattered when he confronted 
Kenneth Gibson and lost ignominiously. So none of this "ideological 
struggle" has been of practical political consequence. 
On the contrary, Barakals conversion is significant in that it sum- 
marizes, as the most dramatic occurrence to date, the genesis of this new. 
magical Marxism. Beyond that the conversion illustrates a process that 
has been going on among black radicals since the dying gasps of the Civii 
Rights Movement -- what might be called a supermarket approach to social 
theory. What has happened is that the radicals have simply accepted and 
pushed one political line until some key personality or core group of 
personalities detects its inherent weaknesses and initiates a search for 
a new line. A key and classic statement of this process is Carmichael's 
call for a new 'ideology' just before everyone became Pan-Africanists. 
To date not one of the shifts of line has generated a systematic critique 
of the political and social world; at best the old line is denounced in 
the terminology of the new, a practice whose primary function is exposurc 
of novitiates to the style and lexicon of the new idolatry. As a col- 
league has noted, black radical practice has not changed in essence sin 
the Civil Rights movement; only the ideological forms -- slogans, justi- 
fications, superficial behavior, etc. -- have shifted. The radicalism 
has been entirely restricted to posture; the roots of capitalist society 
have not been penetrated for all the ideological struggles. One simply 
resigns from the old theology and accepts the new. The magical Marxism 
presently in vogue is only the current manifestation of the process. 
The assertions made here are certain to be denounced by the magicians 
of "scientific socialism" with charges of 'subjectivism' and 'negativeness' 
in addition to disputation of historical and analytical accuracy, so I 
may as well take this opportunity to rebut at the onset. Disputation of 
accuracy is of course perfectly normal, valid and necessary and should 
under all circumstances be welcome. The charges likely to be generated 
fall in another category; yet they are useful in that they are indicative 
of some of the intellectual grounding of the new Marxism. First of all, 
I plead guilty to a degree of 'subjectiveness'. To the extent that human 
beings are not only objects of history but its subjects as well, sub- 
jectivity is a natural component of the dialectic of materialist reality. 
To exclude subjectivity from an autonomous existence is to fetishize 
history or facticity, which is precisely what the magic Marxists in fact 
do. In so far as my specific subjectiveness is concerned, I admit to a 
bias against illusion and an extreme distaste for liberal ideology, es- 
pecially those manifestations which pretend to be something else. 
I also plead guilty in advance to 'negativeness' to the extent that 
I attempt to utilize a method based on critique. At the foundation of a 
materialist epistemology are two assumptions; that there is an indepen- 
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dent reality which can be known only through removal of the layers of 
ideological illusion that conceal it and that human beings develop their 
visions of what ought to exist primarily by renunciation of unpalatable 
aspects of actual existence. Each of those assumptions demands the use 
of negation as an indispensable tool for the understanding-through- 
transformation which is the essential principle of a materialist theory 
of knowledge. As far as the moral aspect of 'negativeness' is concerned, 
I admit to that also. In an objective historical situation in which 
there is no actually or foreseeably effective challenge to the bourgeoisie 
I see nothing about which to be positive. The real cynicism is that 
positive thinking which pretends the trite to be significant and makes up 
things to celebrate in the midst of an oppressive reality. 
At any rate, now that I have admitted my sins, it is time to commit 
them. 
There are three primary objectives at which this essay aims, each 
of which is largely polemical. One objective is, to use the phrase of 
another colleague, to "take the covers off" the magic Marxism to analyze 
its essential elements through critique. A secondary objective is the 
location of the magic Marxism in an historical context by means of illus- 
tration of certain dynamics which I propose have been operative over the 
last decade of black political thought, and the final objective -- which 
should give some satisfaction to the Norman Vincent Peales of scientistic 
socialism -- is some clarification of the general nature of the Marxist 
theory and method by means of statements about what a materialist dia- 
lectical theory is and should be. The key questions are: what is magic 
Marxism and how does it help to interpret and change the world? How and 
why did magic Marxism come to be what it is? How must Marxism operate 
as a critical social philosophy? 
To begin with, it is necessary to consider what it is that makes 
this new black Marxism magical. Ironically, that element of the new 
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Marxism of which the adherents are most proud, that which they believe 
to be the qualitative advance over all magic, is in fact the essential 
kernel which defines this Marxism's fetish character. That element of 
course is its assumption of science as a suprahistorical category which 
passes judgement on all that exists within history. To be considered 
legitimate in the new Marxism, any formulation must be blessed with the 
label "scientific". 
To demonstrate the ways in which science is a fetish in the new 
Marxism it is necessary first to try to determine exactly what the 
'Marxists' mean by science. This task is not that simple, unfortunately, 
because the 'scientific socialists' are so much in awe of their fetish 
that they do not bother to explain exactly what it is. But, then, it is 
always sacrilege for mortals to attempt to analyze God. 
Put most broadly, of course, science is taken to mean that method 
and body of techniques whose careful utilization in analysis produces 
results which reflect -- accurately if not exactly --  a material reality 
which exists independently of its perception by human consciousness. The 
component of this science given most frequently is a certain kind of 
terminology which is intrinsically more capable than are other terminol- 
ogies of reflecting 'reality' in a manner that is unencumbered by the 
subjectivity of the observer. 3 
In addition 'science' includes rigorous definitions which represent 
the real world with precision. Examples of such definitions are Lenin's 
stipulation of class4 with Stalin's definition of nationality.= This 
brings us to our first major problem. It is necessary to ask what makes 
those definitions 'scientific'? The answer must be that the definitions 
are scientific because they identify characteristics which can be observed 
in the empirical world. On this level, the new Marxism is in accord with 
the old empiricism, which is only natural sincp 'science' is the creation 
A problem arises immediately, however; those operational definitions 
given are, like all such definitions, stipulated. Why must a nation be 
"historically constituted", "stable",.etc.? Only because Stalin, for 
whatever reason, stipulates that it must be. This is not to suggest that 
stipulated definitions cannot be valid; on the contrary, since they are 
tautological, they are neither valid nor invalid. Definitions are sti- 
pulated in order to facilitate performance of specific operations, 
systematic aggregation of data along lines determined by the human beings 
who perform the operations. On that basis such a definition can be 
neither true nor false, only more or less useful in the given context. 
If one chooses to commit himself to 'scientific method', then he must 
also commit himself to that amoral relativism, and it is impossible to 
appeal to scientific method to resolve disputes about anything that can 
not be measured. 
Likewise, there is no intrinsically 'scientific' language. Words, 
in the last analysis, have no meanings other than those which specific 
human beings attach to them. To suggest otherwise is to fetishize lan- 
guage, to attribute an independent autonomous existence to a product of 
human social relations. The magic of the new Marxism lies precisely in 
the circumstance that the theory thrives on fetishes.'l 
The examples of language and definitions suggest that the magic 
Marxists are at least confused about what science is. At best they have 
succwnbed to the popular misunderstanding which identifies all systematic 
production of knowledge as science. However, the misconception appears 
to be even more basic. 
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The adherents of scientistic socialism have taken 'science' as a 
pre-given category, a set of impartial techniques which might be put to 
use by either progressive or reactionary forces. In the former case 
utilization of scientific methods will yield progressive results; in the 
latter, reactionary ones. The problem is, though, that intellectual 
systems and frameworks are developed by human beings within society, and 
to that extent those frameworks and systems must reflect the class reality 
of the social order. Therefore, since scientism as an analytic frame of 
reference (rather than merely a number of research techniques) is the 
product of bourgeois society, the method itself must reflect the biases 
of bourgeois social organization. 
There are only two other possibilities. Either science is the pro- 
duct of a suprahuman consciousness (or is invested with its own), or 
science already existed as a package and was merely discovered in the 
bourgeois epoch. In the first case science is mystified, in the latter 
it is reified. The effect of both possibilities is to make science fetish.* 
Science cannot be absolutized if it is taken as the product of a 
given form of social organization. Therefore, science cannot be considered 
the form of knowledge but only a particular form of knowledge. Moreover, -
because this form reflects the ideology of an antagonistic social order, 
it must be partial and insufficient. ~abermas~ notes the attempted 
separation in bourgeois scientism of the subjective and objective aspects 
of knowledge the restriction of philosophy to a metaphysical, specu- 
lative ontology and the alleged elimination of values from science.lO 
As should be expected, the confusion of the new Marxists about the 
nature of science and knowledge is reproduced in their specific propositions 
about the bourgeois social order. These propositions are very interesting 
in as much as they not only demonstrate the existence of the confusion but 
also expose its peculiar character. 
In particular the treatment of the concept of class in scientistic 
socialism demonstrates clearly the wondrous effects of the magic of rei- 
fication. Classes are perceived first of all as statistical aggregates 
whose components ir6 classified and dounted quite laboriously.11 The 
classifications are then further subdivided (e.g. bourgeoisie national 
and comprador sectors) with the presumption that the political consciousness 
of these classes can somehow be inferred from their various positions in 
the social production process. 
In fact, the somewhat overly meticulous relabeling provided by 
Alkalimat and Johnson of census data on black employment and income 
patterns turns out to be the prelude to identification of a "revolutionary 
class of Black workers" who must play an "heroic role" in the destruction 
of capitalism. This role flows from the scientific class analysis which 
determines that "only the working class is in an objective position to 
fundamentally destroy capitalist relations, defeat racism, and build a 
different society . . . ."12 
Two problems arise immediately -- one empirical, the other epistemo- 
logical. First, where is the referent in the real world for a "revolutionary 
class of black workers"? Presumably, so volatile an entity could not 
exist without giving off some hints of its existence. Yet there are no 
signs of even an impending upsurge among black workers, or anyone else 
for that matter. Certainly there are no indications of revolutionary 
confrontation between black workers and the capitalist social order unless 
we accept a conception of revolutionary struggle which would embrace every 
petty wage demand. If our conception is to be of that sort, then 'revolution' 
for us would have about the same meaning as it does in soap powder 
advertisements. 
Still, the magic Marxists project a revolutionary working class as 
a fait accompli, and there must be some basis for that projection. What 
the magic Marxists are actually saying is that given the behavior patterns 
ascribed a priori by 'scientific' class analysis to certain occupation 
and income aggregates, the black working class is supposed to be revolution- 
ary. Somehow, because the black scientistic socialists apparently have 
not quite had the time yet to master even mechanical materialism, their 
claim to 'scientific' precision of analysis backs them into a corner. 
The 'scientific analysis', actually little more than some fixed 
propositions memorized and applied indiscriminately, decrees that black 
workers due to their position in the production process are a revolutionary 
force. The data from the empirical world hardly supports such an assertion. 
Yet since this whole dialectical materialism thing is new to the magic 
Marxists, they are unable to face up to the data. The documents cited 
here from the Black Workers Congress and the African Liberation Support 
Comittee refer time and again to the existence of a mass black movement 
led by black proletariat. One look at the world will confirm that no such 
phenomenon exists. Unfortunately, though, the scientistic socialists are 
not fluent enough in their mechanics yet to give the conventional responses 
about labor aristocracy, duping, etc. They simply refuse to admit to 
current reality. 
Hswever, it is not only at this point that the 'scientific class 
analysis' takes flight from reality; rather, at the onset with the initial 
assumption, it is already gone. This 'scientific' analysis proceeds from 
an assumption that there are inevitable connections between specific forms 
of concrete political consciousness and the aggregate stipulated as classes. 
This assumption acquires a dogmatic character thanks to corollary assumptions 
about 'history' and 'laws' which we shall discuss a bit later. At any rate 
the wholly a priori assumption about the connections of the aggregates and 
patterns of consciousness not only reifies the aggregates -- in the sense 
that they are treated as organic, self-conscious things functioning in the 
world -- but it is also the basis of the second problem. 
Put crudely; what is the process by which revolutionary ideas, leap 
from the wrench to the minds of the workers? That is, how does consciousness 
arise from class position? More abstractly, what is the relationship of 
objectivity and subjectivity in the production of ideas and events? Those 
questions have been among the most salient paoblems of Marxist theory in the 
twentieth century, especially since revolution has been vitiated in the Sori-et 
Union and has failed to materialize at all in the industrial West. However, 
the adherents of magic Marxism seem oblivious to those problems; in fact, 
what they apparently see as the science in Marxism is dogma to which they 
try to mold the world, the rote formulae which explain everything. Ironically, 
for all the sloganeering about scientific materialism, the magic Marxism re- 
veals itself to be the exact opposite. 
The factor which appears most immediately responsible for the idealist 
conceptualizations of scientistic socialism is a general perception of science 
as a body of rigid, inexorable laws. In any notion of laws of social develop- 
ment or social interaction there is already posited some force which exists 
outside of and governs social relations. A law must have an origin somewhere; 
and if it is in fact a law which applies universally, then that origin cannot 
be sought in any specific social situation. These laws are therefore meta- 
physical in that their content does not change from one society to another 
or over time; the laws are also idealist in that they are nonmaterial forces 
which exist and operate independently of hwnan control. 
How can this new Marxism, which wants so badly to be 'scientific', end 
up as the very antithesis of materialist science? An obvious reason is the 
mechanical materialism which the magic Marxists espouse. Their mechanical 
interpretation of social processes stems from a pedestrian reading of Marx's 
aphorism about being of consciousness, and that interpretation has profound 
implications for the likelihood of generating materialist theory and, for that 
matter, revolutionary practice.13 If the process of production is strictly 
determinate of attitudes and therefore actions, then that process becomes a 
force which directs events. In order to do that, the force must stand out- 
side and above society. So it is that a mechanical materialist determinism 
gives rise to a network of axiomatic, suprasoietal laws which can appear as 
science in a culture whose popular ideology worships science as the really 
complete metaphysics (in the bourgeois sense). 
This mechanical materialism, however, is only the methodological conse- 
quence and manifestation of a prior ontological assumption, one that was 
hinted at earlier. The magic Marxists read history from the conclusion to 
the beginning. That is to say, they see history as the inevitable unfolding 
of the specific present and, for that matter, the present as a stage in the 
inevitable unfolding of an already determined future. Feudalism inevitably 
generated capitalism, capitalism will inevitably generate socialism, and so on.14 
What all this inevitability means of course is thathe script of history 
has already been written; the end is pre-determined. Thus history is trans- 
formed into History, an unassailable force which leads us to some pre-arranged 
destination. This History, through its own machinations, has been revealing 
it will to us in gradual stages.15 So we finally come to the bottom of 
scientistic socialism --  the reification of history as an independent process 
whose motion cannot be altered. l6 
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The fetish character of this new Marxism is therefore clearly revealed. 
At every turn there is an idealist formulation masquerading as its opposite. 
The magical ideology proceeds from all illusory, quasi-theological assumptions 
of those 'ideologies' with which the magicians imagine themselves at odds. 
Hence it is possible to say of this new scientistic socialism what Thomas 
Huxley said of its actual philospphical antecedent, Comtism, a century ago 
-- it is "Catholicism with Christianity". 
Still, it is not sufficient merely to Yeake the covers off" the magic 
Marxism and expose it as just another pathetic intellectual paroxysm of the 
would-be 'radical' section of the black petit bourgeoisie. It is necessary 
to attempt to ferret out the origins of this aborted effort to break out of 
chains of bourgeois ideology. I submit that scientistic socialism is a 
product of a certain paradigm that began to develop in response to the self- 
immolation of Black Power radicalism. 
In retrospect the 1960's appear as a period that held great political 
possibiIities for black people in this country. The promise lay neither in 
a likelihood that realization of the amorphous goal of freedom was imminent 
nor ifl signs of theoretical coherence and self-conscious revolutionary praxis. 
On the one hand, serious prediction about "freedom" was precluded by the 
circumstance that no one had any idea what the condition of being free was 
actually supposed to entail, although most people probably felt that 'freedom' 
referred to something more than integrated water fountains. On the other 
hand, much of the elan experienced by those who lived the period was a function 
of -- and in turn reinforced -- the analytical muddle that was general to the 
'movement'. Because each experience or action seemed independent of all others 
and absolutely brand new in the world, fervor was kept high during the decade 
through all the turns that the 'Movement' made. 
In this environment, as the inadequacies of Black Power activism began 
to drain the elan that it had produced, an uninformed search was initiated 
for an equation that would keep the movement together and drive it forward. 
The character of the search, when reflected upon half a decade later, seemed 
generated at least in part by panic. The call for the search, as well as its 
nature, seems best summarized by Stokely Carmichaells call for a new 'ideology', 
defined essentially as a "belief system". 
"Ideology" was conceived as a set of axioms -- eight points of Pan- 
Africanism, seven principles of Kawaida, etc. -- which not only can explain 
the nniverse simply and quickly but also can give its particular ideologues 
something to believe in and a line with which to confront other ideologues. 
Since the search was eclectic, searchers would just cluster around whatever 
system came their way first. Then, when trend setters in a particular camp 
would become bored or dissatisfied and exchange their 'ideology' for a new 
one, their cluster of epigones would -- as is general in fads -- trail behind 
them, no questions asked. The old line is dropped; the new one is assumed. 
There is no discernible transition period, no radical critique of the old. 
When that process is taken into account, scientistic socialism appears 
as no more than the momentary vogue acquisition in the department/store of 
'ideologyt.17 This view is reinforced by the circumstance that at no point 
has any one of the ideologues attempted a root level critique of the ontolo- 
gical and epistemological assumptions that drive bourgeois society. Until 
that kind of critique is made, our 'ideologues' still simply continue to re- 
produce in styles that are ever more bizarre and outlandishly confused the 
metaphysical idealism which constitutes the essential kernel of the bourgeois 
world view. 18 
There are a couple of final points that should be made about some key 
conceptions of Marxism. The relation of subjectivity and objectivity in the 
materialist world view has already been explicated, I think. So has the 
1 question of place and meaning of history; Marxism as a genuinely materialist 
philosophy can allow no reification of the historical process. 
Nonetheless, since Marxism is basically a theory of practice and a 
political practice trhich aims at social revolution, a bit of attention should 
i be given to clear up as much as possible the muddle about the nature and 
i significance of class. In the first place caasses are not things but relations 
I 
abstracted for purpose of analytical focus from the totality of relations 
I 
which exist in society.19 
Class takes on political significance as a conception of Hobjective 
1 possibility1t20, as a potentially active political force; as a compilation of 
I 
I aggregate characteristics the conception of class has no political signifi. 
cance. Marx himself makes this distinction in his differentiation of class- 
in-itself and class-for-itself. The former is the bland, abstract aggregate 
I in which the latter exists -- due to the role of the role of the aggregate 
I 
1 
in the production process --- as an element of latent possibility. Only when 
1 the class-for-itself emerges from the class-in-itself does class assume real 
political meaning. 
Drawing on the United States for his example, ~olletti*~ suggests that 
a class can be said really to exist only if its members are conscious of 
themselves as a class. (On that basis he suggests that workers in this coun- 
try are objectively no more than a cog of capital.] The times at which one 
can actually see classes in the empirical world are very rare; in fact only 
in periods of sharp antagonism and rupture, i.e. only in revolutionary 
situations. 
Therefore, class cannot be treatea by us as a "hard" empirical entity 
whose presence and impact can be rigorously assessed as would so many plants 
or r0lecules.~2 Politically, we cannot view classes, particularly the 
proletariat, as given; our task is to create a revolutionary proletariat 
from the raw material of workers. Nor for that matter can we bind ourselves 
to the aggregates of industrial workers as the exclusive raw material from 
which the revolutionary force is to be built. Factory workers in England in 
the mid-nineteenth century were seen by Marx as the potential vanguard revo- 
lutionary class not simply because they were the majority of the population 
and gave up surplus value, but because specific relations which they had 
among themselves and with capitalists suggested the possibility that from the 
aggregates of factory workers would be most likely to come individuals amen- 
able to making revolutionary social change. Since capitalist social relations 
have undergone extensive changes over the last century, there is no reason 
to believe that the mode of intervention of industrial workers in those re- 
lations has remained constant. Therefore, the question of revolutionary 
possibility -- always an empirically based question -- must be asked in light 
of the present data. Any other approach is theistic and anti-materialist. 
Finally, if this essay has no other merit, it is my hope that it affirms 
the need to take theory to the roots of existence and to aim always for the 
removal of illusion from reality. Of course that aim entails also the need 
to be critical of our own assumptions and methods. Unless we press critical 
analysis to the roots we will only continue to run along the treadmill of 
fetishism and wish-fulfillment and will continue to be functional ideological 
agents of the bourgeoisie. 
NOTES. -
lThe term "scientific socialism" serves two important functions for the 
new Marxists. In the first place it is the method and network of beliefs 
which distinguishes them from the "idealists" and "metaphysicians". 
"Scientific socialism" is posited as the antithesis of astrology, religion 
and all antimaterialist ideologies. As such, of course, this "scientific 
socialism" becomes no more than a manifestation of the same juju but under 
a different form. zThis is not simply a formalist dialectical proposition; 
"science" in this new 'Marxism', as we shall see, is mystified even more 
than it is in other ideologies of the bourgeois epoch. 
Secondly, 'scientific socialism' provides a fortunate appellation for 
those among the ranks who want no association with anything Eu~opean except 
consumer goods; it would be too agonizing for them to have to declare them- 
selves Marxists. This second function at some point dovetails with the 
first. In bourgeois society there is a certain awe surrounding affiliation 
with science, and it is with feelings of great fulfillment and a sense of 
arrival that one can proclaim, "I am a scientific socialist". Those un- 
familiar with the proclamation need only compare it to others like: "I am 
a Christian", "I am a behavioralist", or among the less serious members, 
"I am a Kappa". The phrase "scientistic socialism" which I use here seeks 
to identify this alleged Marxism by one of its central fetishes, 'science'. 
2~ few brief references from the theoretical work of the new Marxists 
illustrate the almost neurotic importance of 'science'. Ronald H. Bailey in 
the introduction to his paper "Imperialism and Black People in the 1970's" 
(unpublished) charges: "Let us not for a moment underestimate the importance 
of a precise and scientific analysis in our struggle for liberation," (p. 1.). 
Nelson Johnson and Abdul Alkalimat, Toward the Ideological Unity of the 
African Liberation Support Committee: A Response to Criticism of the ALSC 
Statement of Principles contend that the new Marxism constitutes a 
theoretical breakthrough partially because it utilizes "objective scientific 
language that analyzes objective material reality" (p. 6.). Abdul Alkalimat 
has subsequently published in pamphlet form an edited version of an earlier 
speech under the title A scientific Approach to Black Liberation (Nashville: 
Peoples College, 1974) in which a clear attempt is made to legitimize the 
political positions of the new Marxism through appeals to their scientific 
nature. In the heady document produced by the Black Workers Congress, 
Black Liberation Struggle: The Black Workers Congress and Proletarian 
Revolution (Detroit: BWC, 1974) appears the following assessment: "Today 
Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse Tung is the only true social 
science in the world ... it is as objective as any of the other sciences like 
physics, chemistry, etc." (p. 7.). 
'~lkalimat and Johnson, op. cit., in counter attack against the self- 
conscious idealists in ALSC provide a list of words and phrases which the 
authors assert to be "precise and scientific" (p. 13.). Presumably, science 
also includes methods of procedure and an overarching framework; these 
probably are respectively historical and dialectical materialism. Within 
Marxism now there is a great deal of debate over those constructs and their 
entailments; yet the scientistic socialists nowhere attempt to explicate 
thier position in this debate. Consequently, 'dialectical and historical 
materialism' are no more than words to magic Marxism. 
~c.F. Alkalimat, op. cit., p. 3.; Alkalimat and Johnson, 9. cit., p. 50. 
5C.F. Black Workers Congress, op. cit., p. 12.; Alkalimat, op. cit., p. 4.; 
Alkalimat and Johnson, p. 50. 
%.F. Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1972), particularly the essays "Notes on Science and the Crisis" and "The 
Latest Attack on Metaphysics." 
7 ~ t  imes it appears that the scientistic socialists have managed to 
appropriate the most bizarre and idealistic elements of both empiricism and 
rationalism. On the one hand, they burn incense to the Great God Science; 
on the other hand, they continually prate about a certain Mr. History who 
demands this and will decide that. 
8~ critical look at the development of what has been considered scientific 
methodology removes these propositions from the realm of deductive logic and 
gives them a concrete reality. Horkheimer observes that in the early period, 
when bourgeois ideology was in battle against Scholasticism, the inceptionary 
scientific method was formulated as a device which would emancipate inquiry. 
"But by the second half of the nineteenth century this definition had already 
lost its progressive character, and showed itself to be ... a limiting of 
scientific activity to the description, classification, and generalization of 
phenomena, with no care to distinguish the unimportant f the essential." 
op. cit., p. 5. 
Horkheimer notes the static, and thereby reactionary, biases inherent in 
positivism, the contemporary form of scientism: "Knowledge relates solely to 
what is and its recurrence. New forms of being, especially those arising 
from the historical activity of man, lie beyond empiricist theory ... All 
historical tendencies that reach beyond what is present and recurrent, do not 
belong to the domain of science." .=., p. 144. Horkheimer contends that 
the ideological roots of the positlvlst style of scientism are to be found 
in the frightened petit bourgeoisie. E., p. 140. 
'c.F. Jurgen Habermas, Kn'owledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon, 
1971). 
lowhile objectivity and subjectivity are not considered antinomies in 
the epistemology of dialectical materialism to which the magic Marxists 
purport to adhere, (cf. Alkalimat, op: cit., p. 23.), the latter nowhere 
explicate what that dialectical materlallsm is to entail as a methodology. 
In the face of the reverence for 'science' as a transcendent arbiter of 
interpretation, however, as well as the recurring drivel about "historical 
laws", it is impossible to view this magic Marxism as either dialectical or 
materialist. 
"c.F. Alkalimat & Johnson, op. cit., pp. 33-49 and Ronald H. Bailey, . 
op. cit., pp. 17-22. 
121bid., p. 57. See also The Black Liberation Struggle, etc., op. cit., 
p. 6. 
13c.~. Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review, 
1970). Korsch sees the mechanical, positivist interpretation of Marxism 
which subordinates human consciousn&s and action to-so called "objective 
processes" as part of the central problem of Marxism in this century. He 
traces that interpretation to Plekhanov and contends that that positivist 
reading of Marxist theory is the root theoretical cause of the opportunism 
of the Second International. Interestingly, he sees Plekhanov at the founda- 
tion of Russian Marxism (through Lenin) and links the latter philosophically 
withthe Second Inxernational. In so far as action and consciousness are 
seen as dependent on economic processes the door is clearly open to economism 
and pragmatism in general. Rather, objective conditions are themselves the 
product of a continuous dialectic between material forces and conscious action; 
hence all talk of waiting for contradictions to mature or imposing impersonal 
stages on development are no more than mealy-mouthed opportunism and mystifi- 
cation. 
140ne of the magic Marxists with whom I am familiar argued in a seminar 
at the time of the coup against Allende that the coup was a progressive de- 
velopment to the extent that it demonstrated to the Chilean left the futility 
of electoral revolution and would therefore--in the long run (the Judgement 
Day in mechanical materialism) -- facilitate the building of a stronger, more 
militant revolutionary movement. When asked how he could be so optimistic 
in light of the grim extirpation of leftists then in process in Chile, he 
demanded that the individuals be considered separately from the political 
tendency. The former could be destroyed, but the latter cannot! This anecdote 
should clear up whatever questions the reader might have had concerning why 
I have dubbed this peculiar, would-be Marxism "magic". 
15~ressed up in mock materialist garb this proposition becomes something 
like: Human awareness of the motive forces in history always corresponds to 
the level of objective development of the mode of production; prior to the 
capitalist epoch it was impossible for any human being to think democracy, 
scientific socialism, or any of the ideologies of the bourgeois epoch. Each 
stage of development of the mode of production paves the way for the ensuing 
stage; this process is an inevitable product of the law of contradiction 
between the forces and relations of production in society." 
161t is interesting to compare this view with that of Marx: "History 
does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, fights no battles. It is rather 
man, real living man who does everything, who possesses and fights". Cited -
in E.H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 61. 
171t is instructive in this regard that less than three years ago most 
of the magic Marxists, at least in the ALSC wing, were Pan-Africanists of 
the most wildly mystical variety; moreover, they were just as self-righteous 
and dogmatic about that drivel as they now are about the current drivel. 
For the ex-Kawaida Nationalists the case is even more dramatic. Less than 
a year ago they were greater enemies of Marxism than J. Edgar Hoover or 
Little Orphan Annie. 
IgThat metaphysical idealism is at the base of this process is clear to 
the extent that the search was begun because we had to develop the ability 
to 'redefine' our history and condition. This 'redefinition' meant first 
and foremost the redefinition a la analytic philosophy--a hopelessly abstract 
and detached shuffling and reshuffling of words. The 'ideological struggle' 
has never been any more than that, as the battle over terminology in ALSC 
shows. However, the basic point is that no matter what form the popular 
'ideology' has taken, it has been grounded at every turn on the same funda- 
mentally idealist assumptions about humankind and history. 
19"~he notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. 
Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we 
attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure. 
The finest-meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class.. . 
The relations hi^ must always be embodied in real ~ e o ~ l e  and in a real content". 
E.P. Thompson; h e  Making bf The English Working 'Clais (New York: Random 
House, 1963), p. 9. 
~OC.F. Georg Lukacs; History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist 
Dialectics (Cambridge: MIT, 1971). 
21~ucio Colletti; From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society 
(New York: Monthly Review, 1972), p. 235. 
Z~C.F. Thompson; op. cit., pp. 9-11. 
